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the trial that convicted Hiss had been the exhausting high point of a judicial 
career that began when President Harding appointed him to the federal bench 
almost thirty years before; for the part he had played in sending Hiss to prison, 
he had received praise from the press, presumed pats on the back from the 
political and social circles in which he moved (see his last listing in Who's Who 
for these), and popular acclaim such as a trial judge very rarely knows. Is it 
too far-fetched to wonder whether the newly headlined old jurist may not have 
been, at the least, reluctant to put all this aggregated attention in jeopardy by 
risking?counter to his own pretty patent predilections?having Hiss's con? 
viction overturned by a new jury faced with Lane's new and damning ma? 
terial? For be it remembered here that no jury has ever passed on the stuff 
that Lane dug up after Hiss was in prison; it was passed on?and passed off 
?by one man alone: Judge Goddard. Further, the major reason Judge God- 
dard did give for denying another trial was that any new evidence discovered 
by Lane was either too trivial to warrant one or should have been discovered 
in time for the prior trial if the defense had used "due diligence." This may 
be good law, verbally, but it is something less than good justice. It is consider? 
ably less than good justice?and is not even good law?if Lane's flat accusa- 
tion that the FBI bent every effort to prevent the defense from getting evidence 
is true. 
I defy any open-minded lawyer to read reporter Cook's book (remember it? 
?these comments were all sparked by it) and not come away with the same 
conclusion I did: either Chester T. Lane should be disbarred from further 
practice of law or every member of the FBI, no matter how highly placed, who 
knowingly helped frame Alger Hiss should be exposed and fired. For it is just 
as impossible to believe that Lane did not lie in his new-trial motion and that 
the FBI did not help frame Hiss and keep him framed as it is to believe that 
Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers both told the truth. 
Fred RoDEixf 
fProfessor of Law, Yale Law School. 
Not Guilty. By Jerome and Barbara Frank. Garden City, N.Y.: Double? 
day & Company, Inc, 1957. Pp. 261. $3.75. 
This humane and disturbing book discusses thirty-six examples, eighteen 
in detail, of the conviction of wholly innocent people. Clear and nontechnical 
descriptions of the cases by Barbara Frank are followed by critical analyses 
completed by her distinguished father just before his death. 
To people happily situated, the phrase "miscarriage of justice" may connote 
little more than an idea to be vaguely deplored and then dismissed from the 
mind. But, for those who are devastatingly affected, it is very real and tragic. 
It was no fleeting abstraction to Joe Majczek, who served twelve years for a 
murder he knew nothing about; or to his heroic and devoted mother, who 
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scrubbed floors at night for eleven years to earn enough to offer a reward for 
the real killers; or to Majczek's equally innocent codefendant, Ted Marcin- 
kiewicz, who served seventeen years. Or to Nancy Botts, a young bride who 
lost her unborn baby due to the emotional and physical strain of being con? 
fined to jail awaiting trial because of inability to raise bail, and who left prison 
in broken health after serving two years for a forgery she did not commit. Or 
to Nathan Kaplan, who served seven and a half years for a narcotics offense 
with which he had no connection, and whose eighteen-year struggle to clear 
his name ultimately failed when his application for pardon was inexplicably 
denied, even though it was recommended after a full hearing in the careful 
opinion of a judge who, "with extreme reluctance," could find no strictly legal 
ground for setting aside his conviction and thus remedying "a grave miscar- 
riage of justice."1 Not Guilty describes and explains these and other grievous 
errors in the administration of the criminal law in a way appealing to laymen 
as well as lawyers. Easy to read, relatively short, and free of footnotes and 
technical terms, its stated purpose "is to get each of you keenly interested, to 
stir you to a lively sense of in justice about the plight of the wrong man con? 
victed of a crime."2 The book reflects throughout Jerome Frank's dynamic 
concern for fairness and for the dignity of the individual. If everyone were 
equally dedicated to these principles of democracy, the tragedies exemplified 
in this book would occur less frequently. 
Edwin Borchard's profound and pioneering work, Convicting the Innocent, 
published in 1932, was motivated by the same fundamental objective and in- 
evitably has some things in common with this book in identifying the reasons 
for erroneous convictions, as well as, of course, general attitude. But Not 
Guilty is by no means simply repetitious. Borchard's major purpose was to 
enlist support for governmental indemnity for errors in criminal prosecutions, 
the theory and comparative law of which he discussed very thoroughly, and to 
demonstrate by sixty-five cases of the conviction of innocent people (selected 
from a much larger number tracked down by long and patient investigation) 
that such compensation was an important and not an academic matter. Jerome 
and Barbara Frank support Borchard's thesis briefly but unequivocally ("a 
crying need"3) and devote their attention primarily to detailed consideration 
of other questions, only some of which were mentioned by Borchard. And their 
book not only promotes new ideas, but also adds factual fuel to the fire, since 
only one of their cases was also discussed by Borchard.4 
Some of the factors that may contribute to an erroneous conviction are prob? 
ably unavoidable consequences of the fallibility of human beings. As Judge 
Frank explains in detail, any notion that the "facts" as ultimately found in a 
trial necessarily correspond with the original events involves naive and illusory 
1. P. 110. 
2. P. 38. 
3. P. 118. 
4. This case involves James W. Preston, whose experience is outlined by the Franks 
at pp. 90-96 and by Borchard at pp. 194-200. 
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oversimplification. Witnesses of the same occurrence observe differently, recol- 
lect differently, and differ in the effectiveness and accuracy of their narration 
on the stand; testimony is the product of complex human processes and not 
simply a photographic reproduction of external stimuli. The observation of 
the victim of a crime may be seriously distorted by emotional disturbance ex? 
perienced at the time of the crime's commission, and this may result in mis? 
taken identification of the accused, a major cause of conviction of the innocent; 
once identification has been made, the victim may persistently adhere to it, his 
pride making him reluctant to admit error. Witnesses for the prosecution may 
be of questionable veracity. The innocent defendant may make a very poor 
witness, either because he is overwhelmed by his appalling situation or for 
other reasons; he may convey an impression of guilt and perhaps even resort 
to some attempt at deception in a desperate effort to avoid conviction. The liar 
or abnormal witness may put on a convincing show, while the truthful witness 
may become confused or appear otherwise unimpressive. The attentiveness and 
accuracy of recollection of jurors vary. These deficiencies cannot be eliminated. 
But their existence should be clearly recognized, and every precaution should 
be taken to guard against their contributing to such gross in justices as those 
revealed in this book. 
Certainly, these tragic mistakes should not be promoted by those in charge 
of law enforcement. Yet Not Guilty describes erroneous convictions induced 
by official conduct ranging from the wholly indefensible to the perhaps well- 
meant but nevertheless misleading: third-degree confessions; perjuries coerced 
by threats of prosecution for some offense the witness has committed; altering 
a suspect's photograph to make it correspond with a description previously 
given by a witness asked to identify it; persistent pressure on an initially un- 
certain witness to make a positive identification; failure to reveal exonerating 
evidence; exhibiting a suspect alone instead of in a line-up with others of 
similar appearance; suggestive and leading interrogation of witnesses. Exces- 
sively zealous police work or prosecution are in turn caused by such factors 
as personal ambition, public clamor for solution of a crime or, when the murder 
victim is a police officer, an impelling desire to avenge his death without delay. 
It is difficult to tell how widespread such practices are, but that they should 
occur at all is a distressing commentary on what is supposed to be the ad? 
ministration of justice. The majority of them, at least, would be indignantly 
repudiated by the many highminded and intelligent people conscientiously en? 
gaged in law enforcement in this country. In fairness to such people, and by 
way of contrast, Not Guilty describes some cases of unremitting efforts by a 
prosecutor, the FBI or local police to clear the name of a convicted person 
when, after the trial, they became convinced of his innocence. 
Another disturbing element in the situation, of which this book gives several 
examples, is the frustration of a long struggle for vindication caused by almost 
incredible reluctance or refusal to grant a pardon to a person whose innocence 
seems clearly demonstrated, the application being either flatly rejected, or met 
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with the compromise (described by the authors as "a sort of schizoid justice"5) 
of commutation and release on parole that fails to accomplish the major objec? 
tive of exoneration, or held without action for so long that the applicant dies 
and is past pardoning. It is very difficult indeed to present convincing evidence 
of innocence to a pardoning authority which cannot act simply on the asser? 
tions of the individual involved. But when, as in the case of Nathan Kaplan, 
the prosecutor admits that the conviction was wrong, the trial court judge 
transmits in a copy of his careful opinion, written after a full hearing, his be? 
lief in the accused's innocence and his hope for a full pardon, and when the 
application for pardon is held for over four years and then denied, one wonders 
what the function of the pardoning power is supposed to be. It is impossible 
to make full restitution to a person in this situation. Even the governmental 
compensation so persuasively recommended by Borchard, probably the only 
practical means of trying to make amends, would be only partial atonement for 
the mental anguish and other nonmonetary injuries caused by erroneous arrest, 
trial and imprisonment. If the innocence of the individual is satisfactorily sub- 
stantiated, the least that can be done for him by the government responsible 
for his plight is to clear his name. 
Not Guilty suggests a variety of procedural reforms. Throughout the book 
runs Judge Frank's indignation at the callous philosophy that views a pro? 
ceeding affecting the liberty, and perhaps the life, of an individual as an excit- 
ing contest of wits between opposing counsel, who may use any tactics that the 
rules of the game allow in attempts to destroy the credibility of honest witnesses 
or otherwise obscure the truth. As one step in the direction of fairer proceed? 
ings, he recommends giving the accused enlarged discovery remedies so that 
he may perhaps find exonerating material in the hands of the prosecution, and 
at least will not be trapped at trial by the production of evidence that takes him 
by surprise. 
Judge Frank is also much concerned about the unequal positions of the 
prosecution and the defense. In his words, "a man may be convicted when his 
only crime is that of being poor."6 And, as he points out, even the impoverished 
accused may be in a better position than the low-income white collar worker, 
whose resources may be sufficient to exclude him from representation by legal 
aid, a public defender or a court-appointed attorney, but insufficient to afford 
the fees normally charged by expert counsel. And, even with the most com? 
petent lawyer, an innocent person may be convicted because of inability to 
finance such vital aspects of a defense as tracing a missing witness who might 
convincingly support an alibi or obtaining the services of an expert whose testi? 
mony might exonerate him. The remedy proposed is to have the same govern? 
ment that supports the prosecutors and their investigators assume a much 
greater responsibility for supplying the accused with an adequate defense than 
many jurisdictions do at present. In so far as governments do not afford such 
5. P. 82. 
6. P. 86. 
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protection, it is all the more important for police and prosecutors to recognize 
the disparity between their position and that of the defense and to conduct an 
impartial investigation, searching for evidence of innocence as well as guilt. 
Several of the erroneous convictions described in this book were attributable 
to the fact that the accused had a previous record. Past convictions not only 
increase the likelihood of arrest for a similar crime, but also, under the pres? 
ently unsatisfactory and deceptive state of our law, put defense counsel in a 
dilemma at the trial. The defendant is supposed to be protected by his privilege 
not to take the stand, but the protection is largely theoretical since he is very 
likely to be found guilty if he does not testify?one would naturally expect an 
innocent person to be eager to grasp at the first opportunity to refute the evi? 
dence offered against him. The attorney for an innocent accused will therefore 
wish, prima facie, to put him on the stand. If his client has a record, however, 
he is faced with the essentially contradictory and unrealistic propositions that 
a prior conviction is generally inadmissible on the merits, but if the defendant 
testifies, it is admissible to attack his credibility. The first proposition recog? 
nizes the prejudicial effect of such evidence inherent in the exaggerated tend? 
ency of many people to assume that a person once in trouble with the law will 
be a repeater. The second proposition, originating, perhaps without enough 
consideration of its own implications, as a liberalization of the old rule of com? 
plete incompetency to testify, would, even as applied to witnesses generally, be 
difficult to substantiate empirically. Human beings are diverse and complicated 
and are not susceptible of the easy and arbitrary classification into "good" and 
"bad" people that such a rule envisages. The relevancy for impeachment of 
prior conviction of an offense involving deception is arguable, but what basis 
is there for assuming that the commission of a crime of violence indicates a 
propensity to commit perjury thereafter in some entirely different context? 
And, if the witness is the accused, admission of his previous record belies the 
supposed policy against prejudicial evidence since, regardless of any attempted 
precautions set out in the trial ritual, it is humanly impossible for it not to have, 
at least to some extent, the theoretically forbidden effect of indicating guilt of 
the present crime rather than merely lack of veracity. This is particularly true 
if the prior offenses were similar to the one for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted. Reasonable doubts about the credibility of the accused are much 
more likely to be based on his vital and obvious interest in obtaining an acquit? 
tal than on some vague inference from past transgressions. In a jury trial, as 
Judge Frank points out, the supposed protection of a limiting instruction may 
not only be ineffective, as it usually is, but may well do the defendant more 
harm than good. It emphasizes the past record in the juror's minds while urg- 
ing them to perform the almost impossible task of adhering to a legal distinc? 
tion between merits and impeachment. The innocent accused who has been 
previously convicted of another offense is thus placed in an especially danger? 
ous position; guilt may be inferred from silence if he does not testify and from 
his record if he does. Reforms in this area, recommended by Judge Frank and 
repeatedly urged by other members of the legal profession, are long overdue. 
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The important time to try to protect a possibly innocent suspect is the period 
before his trial ends, and particularly before it begins. Once the case is in court, 
the stories of the witnesses, even if actually mistaken or perjured, will have 
solidified; and the prosecutor will assume the role of trial lawyer rather than 
that of investigator. If, when the trial ends, the accused is found guilty, the 
conviction may be very difficult to upset. The appellate court will frequently 
affirm, and other legal remedies, as shown in Not Guilty, are not likely to be 
successful. The person who has exhausted all available remedies in court may 
then apply for clemency, but that may raise insoluble problems for both the 
applicant and the pardoning authority. 
The difficulties of attempting to upset a conviction by invoking the pardon? 
ing power may be illustrated by a few of the situations that have come before 
the Connecticut State Board of Pardons during the more than twenty years I 
have been a member of it. A man sentenced on a plea of guilty some time later 
claims that he was innocent. He was represented by counsel and otherwise 
legally protected at the time of his plea. No record or testimony is available. 
From the Board's perspective, it is conceivable that he was in fact not guilty 
and agreed to the plea because of fright or for some other reason, but how 
can it obtain data on which to base such a finding ? A similar situation exists 
when the convicted person's attorney, seeing no chance for a reversal, took no 
appeal, so that the testimony was never transcribed. And, even if a transcript 
is available, it is very difficult to evaluate the comparative merits of conflicting 
testimony on the basis of the dry written word. Demeanor evidence may be 
misleading, but at least it affords a better opportunity for judging credibility 
than pages of print. Another example of the baffling problem of finding a re? 
liable way to determine the truth of an assertion of innocence is the situation 
where a petitioner has been convicted partly on the testimony of an alleged 
accomplice and the accomplice later makes a variety of inconsistent statements, 
some retracting and some affirming his testimony. Which of the accomplice's 
conflicting assertions is to be believed, and how can the effect of his testimony 
at the trial be weighed against that of the other witnesses ? Our Board, com? 
posed of the Governor, a member of the Supreme Court, and four others ap? 
pointed by the Governor, has always made every effort to give prompt, sym- 
pathetic and conscientious attention to the claims of those appearing before it. 
Nevertheless, there are dead-end streets, and Judge Frank may well be right 
in contending that there are innocent people who are in prison, who even have 
been executed, because of their inability to demonstrate their innocence. It is 
probably impossible to devise any system of reviewing convictions that will 
leave its administrators satisfied that justice is uniformly accomplished. It is 
therefore extremely important to try to prevent an erroneous conviction from 
occurring in the first place. 
The character and attitudes of those who administer the criminal law are 
far more important than the mechanical details of any system. The experience 
of our Board of Pardons indicates that the problems raised in this book have 
had less impact in Connecticut than they have apparently had in some other 
1326 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 
jurisdictions. We are only rarely asked to grant an absolute pardon, except to 
prevent deportation, where a finding of innocence is no prerequisite to relief. 
Almost all our petitions are for reduction of a minimum sentence, based on a 
good prison record and indicia of rehabilitation, with the objective of making 
the inmate eligible for parole. All death sentences come before us to determine 
the desirability of commutation to life imprisonment; the arguments in these 
capital cases have been based on extenuating circumstances rather than on con- 
tentions that the petitioner was not implicated. Assertions of innocence have 
been comparatively rare. Even intimations of improper treatment by the police 
or prosecutor have been virtually nil. Complaints about inadequate represen? 
tation by defense counsel have been more frequent, but are often obviously 
baseless, as when a highly emotional attack is made on the motives of an at? 
torney known personally to the Board to be of fine character. Any advantages 
this state may have along these lines may be attributable to a variety of human 
and geographic conditions, but the most influential factor is a living and con? 
stant awareness that those who are involved in the administration of the crimi? 
nal law should be understanding people of high character and intelligence; that 
the vital objective of protecting the members of society at large should not 
obscure the importance of also protecting the interests of people suspected of 
crime; and that the public interest is least served when the wrong man is con? 
victed, leaving the real offender still at large. The operation of this tradition 
could be illustrated by numerous examples of fair-minded, sympathetic and 
intelligent conduct by state's attorneys, by public defenders and by other mem? 
bers of the bar who, sometimes at considerable personal sacrifice, have repre? 
sented those accused or convicted of crime with great vigor and devotion. In 
such attitudes lie the strongest safeguards against wrongful conviction. 
But people directly charged with criminal administration will reflect the 
climate of opinion surrounding them. Even the residents of a jurisdiction where 
the problems raised in this book seem infrequent cannot afford complacency. 
Moral values are not predicated on quantitative measurement. Even if only 
one conviction out of several hundred thousand is erroneous, the possibility of 
its occurrence should disturb us. It is depressingly ironical that so many 
Americans should entertain themselves at great length with fictional accounts 
of crime and that so few should interest themselves in the situations of the real 
people involved. In trying to alert more people to the problems of erroneous 
convictions, Jerome and Barbara Frank have made a fine contribution to a 
better understanding and, possibly, more complete achievement of the ideals 
of democracy. 
ASHBEL G. GuLLIVERf 
fGarver Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
